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The China-United Kingdom Income Tax Treaty (2011)
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The author, in this article, considers some of the key features
of the China-United Kingdom Income Tax Treaty (2011), with
particular reference to the provisions on technical fees, permanent
establishments, passive and other income, and anti-avoidance
rules.
1. Introduction
On 27 June 2011, the China-United Kingdom Income Tax Treaty (2011)
(the “2011 Treaty”)1 was signed. The United Kingdom completed its
domestic ratification procedures in November 2011,2 but, as at the
time of the writing of this writing, the 2011 Treaty had not yet
entered into force. In contrast to several other new or revised
tax treaties that China has signed that await ratification,3
China’s State Administration of Taxation (SAT), which is normally
responsible for the negotiation of tax treaties, has yet to release
the Chinese version of the 2011 Treaty. The 2011 Treaty’s effective
date is, therefore, still unknown.
On 27 February 2013, a Protocol amending the 2011 Treaty (the
1.
Agreement between the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and
the Government of the People's Republic of China for the Avoidance of Double Taxation and the Prevention of
Fiscal Evasion with respect to Taxes on Income and on Capital Gains (27 June 2011), Treaties IBFD
[hereinafter: P.R.C.-U.K. Income Tax Treaty (2011)].
2.
UK: Double Taxation Relief and International Tax Enforcement (China) Order 2011 (S. I. 2011/2724),
available at www.legislation.gov.uk/uksi/2011/2724/pdfs/uksi_20112724_en.pdf.
3.
For instance, the tax treaties that China has concluded with Ethiopia (2009), Belgium (2009), Zambia
(2010), Syria (2010) and Malta (2010), See
www.chinatax.gov.cn/n8136506/n8136593/n8137537/n8687294/index.html for a list of published Chinese tax
treaties in-force and pending.
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“Protocol (2013)”),4 was signed and was immediately announced by
both governments the next day. The amendment modifies a provision
in the Dividend article in the 2011 Treaty (further discussed in
section 4.) that appeared to be unusually favourable to UK investors,
and was presumably requested by China. This development suggests
that the parties have had occasion recently to revisit and agree
their positions. Accordingly, the respective ratifications of the
2011 Treaty may, at the time of the writing of this article, not
be too distant.
This article examines select aspects of the 2011 Treaty, which
constitutes a substantial revision of the existing treaty between
the two countries, the China-United Kingdom Income Tax Treaty (1984)
(the “1984 Treaty”).5 The 1984 Treaty , signed on 26 July 1984 and
taking effect for both countries in 1985,6 was the fourth
comprehensive tax treaty concluded by China and, along with the
China-Japan Income Tax Treaty (1983),7 one of the first of China’s
tax treaties to take effect. It is not the intention of this article
to comprehensively list of the major changes in the 2011 Treaty
(what is a “major” change depends, in any case, on the perspective
adopted).8 Instead, this article focuses on several features of the
2011 Treaty that are unusual with regard to either China or the
United Kingdom, and sometimes for both countries. Many of these
features also raise issues of interpretation that apply to many
4.
Protocol amending the Agreement between the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain
and Northern Ireland and the Government of the People’s Republic of China for the Avoidance of Double
Taxation and the Prevention of Fiscal Evasion with respect to Taxes on Income and on Capital Gains (27 Feb.
2013), Treaties IBFD, also available at www.hmrc.gov.uk/taxtreaties/signed/china-uk-protocol.pdf.
5.
Agreement between the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and
the Government of the People's Republic of China for the Reciprocal Avoidance of Double Taxation and the
Prevention of Fiscal Evasion with respect to Taxes on Income and Capital Gains (26 July 1984), Treaties IBFD
[hereinafter: P.R.C.-U.K. Income Tax Treaty (1984)].
6.
The P.R.C.-U.K. Income Tax Treaty (1984) was amended by Protocol Amending the Agreement between
the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the Government of the
People's Republic of China for the Reciprocal Avoidance of Double Taxation and the Prevention of Fiscal
Evasion with respect to Taxes on Income and Capital Gains (2 Sept. 1996), Treaties IBFD [hereinafter: Protocol
(1996) to the P.R.C.-U.K. Income Tax Treaty (1984)].
7.
Agreement between the Government of Japan and the Government of the People's Republic of China
for the Avoidance of Double Taxation and the Prevention of Fiscal Evasion with respect to Taxes on Income (6
Sept. 1983), Treaties IBFD.
8.
Important changes between the P.R.C.-U.K. Income Tax Treaty (2011) and the P.R.C.-U.K. Income Tax
Treaty (1984) that are not considered in this article include: (1) changes to the Business Profits article to
acknowledge both the deductibility of arm’s-length expenses (also confirmed through an explicit provision for
such deductibility in the Non-Discrimination article) and the method of attribution by apportionment; (2) the
provision for coordinated adjustments, including through competent authority consultation, in determining the
profits of associated enterprises; (3) the deletion of exemptions for teachers and researchers and the curtailing of
exemptions for students, with grandfathering for individuals entitled to relevant benefits before the P.R.C.-U.K.
Income Tax Treaty (2011) takes effect; (4) extending the scope of mutual agreement procedures; (5) the deletion
of tax sparing provisions in the Elimination of Double Taxation article; and (6) an extensive updating of the
Exchange of Information article to reflect current OECD norms.
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other tax treaties.9 In the following four sections, the author
examines these features, i.e. the now-deleted Technical fees
article (see section 2.), and the Permanent Establishment (PE)
article (see section 3.), the passive and other income articles
(see section 4.) and the anti-avoidance provisions (see section
5.) of the 2011 Treaty.
2. Technical Fees
The deletion of the Technical fees article in the 2011 Treaty is
likely to be unsurprising to many readers. A similar article appears
in only twice in China’s tax treaties, i.e. the China-India (1994)10
and China-Pakistan (1989)11 Income Tax Treaties, and the United
Kingdom has abandoned the use of such an article in its recent tax
treaties. The significance of this article in the 1984 Treaty has
also diminished over the years due to the application of the PE
and royalties articles. However, the process by which this has
happened involves an interesting history of both bilateral
negotiations and treaty interpretation in China. Some of this
history is considered here, lest it be (further) buried and
forgotten following the deletion of the Technical fees article.
Article 13(3) of the 1984 Treaty, before its amendment in the
Protocol (1996), defined “technical fees” as:
[PCD single spaced]
... payments of any kind to any person in consideration for
any services of a technical, supervisory or consultancy
nature, including the use of, or the right to use,
information concerning industrial, commercial or
scientific experience, but it does not include payments
made to an employee of the person making the payments for
dependent personal services mentioned in Article 16.
In the very first domestic guidance on treaty interpretation issued
by the Chinese government,12 the Ministry of Finance announced that
9.
See the discussions of the criteria in respect of independent agency (in section 3.), the “special
relationship” limitation in the Other Income article (in section 4.) and the “purpose of creation or assignment”
rule (in section 5.).
10.
Agreement between the Government of the Republic of India and the Government of the People's
Republic of China for the Avoidance of Double Taxation and the Prevention of Fiscal Evasion with respect to
Taxes on Income (18 July 1994), Treaties IBFD.
11.
Agreement between the Government of the People's Republic of China and the Government of the
Islamic Republic of Pakistan for the Avoidance of Double Taxation and the Prevention of Fiscal Evasion with
respect to Taxes on Income (27 Dec. 1989), Treaties IBFD.
12.
Tax Administration of the Ministry of Finance, Opinion regarding the Treatment of Certain Issues in
the Implementation of the China-Japan and China-UK Treaties ([85] Caishuiwaizi 042, 26 Mar. 1985).
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supervisory activities related to “a building site or a
construction, installation or assembly project” should be taxed
under the Technical fees article and the PE rule in article 5(3)
of the 1984 Treaty, according to which such a site or project
constitutes a PE only if lasted for more than six months, did not
apply.13 Presumably, this meant that whether or not supervisory
activities constituted a PE was not subject to the six-month rule,
but, rather, to the other provisions of article 5, for example,
a fixed place PE could exist despite a duration of less than six
months. This appears to be a literally correct reading of the 1984
Treaty, given the absence of any reference to supervisory
activities in article 5 of that tax treaty and the explicit reference
to such activities in the Technical fees article. There was, however,
a hidden misunderstanding. In 1990, the SAT released an internal
circular14 stating that the lack of prior negotiating experience
on China’s part had resulted in divergent interpretations of the
1984 Treaty and problems regarding its implementation. It was also
disclosed that, at meetings between the tax authorities of China
and the United Kingdom held in London between 16 and 19 July 1990,
the parties had engaged in “pragmatic discussions” and reached
agreement regarding “a majority of issues”, while further
discussions were to be had regarding outstanding disagreements.
One of the several agreed outcomes of the London meeting, was that
without revising the text of the 1984 Treaty, article 5 would be
applied to supervisory activities “in specific implementation”.15
If supervisory activities were carried out under a contract that
included “contractual engineering”16 activities, the
determination of whether or not the activities constituted a PE
should be made according to the six-month rule in article 5(3).
If a PE was found to exist, fees for supervisory activities would
be taxed as business profits, otherwise, the fees were to be taxed
under the Technical fees article.
A second outcome of the 1990 London consultation concerned yet
another unintended encroachment of the Technical fees article on
another article of the 1984 Treaty. Specifically, it was agreed
that fees for the use of “information concerning industrial,
13.
Id, sec. 2(5).
14.
SAT, Notice Regarding the Interpretation of Certain Provisions in the China-UK Tax Treaty
(Guoshuihanfa [1990]1097, 8 Aug. 1990).
15.
Id, sec. 1(3).
16.
That is “a building site or a construction, installation or assembly project”. For the use of the term
“contractual engineering” to refer to article 5(3) activities, see SAT, Annotations on the Provisions of the
Agreement between the Government of the People’s Republic of China and the Government of the Republic of
Singapore for the Avoidance of Double Taxation and the Prevention of Fiscal Evasion with respect to Taxes on
Income and of the Protocol thereto, Guoshuifa [2010] 75 (16 July 2010).
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commercial or scientific experience” should be covered by the
Royalties article (article 12) of the 1984 Treaty, instead of the
Technical fees article. Which article applied was important, as
the tax rate on technical fees was set at a maximum of 7%, whereas
for royalties (other than equipment rentals) the maximum was 10%.
According to the SAT Circular, the parties agreed that “so as not
to have to amend the language of the treaty”, both sides would,
during the “actual implementation” of the 1984 Treaty, interpret
“information concerning industrial, commercial or scientific
experience” as a form of proprietary technology. This extraordinary
tacit understanding was not evidenced by any published instrument
in the 1984 Treaty. Interestingly, the Protocol (1996) amending
the 1984 Treaty formalized the solution by transferring the
language regarding “information concerning industrial, commercial
or scientific experience” from its unintended place in the
Technical fees article to the Royalties article.17 However, nothing
was done to codify the understanding that supervisory activities
in relation to “a building site or a construction, installation
or assembly project” would be subject to the six-month rule of
article 5(3). This mutual understanding is now only explicitly
reflected in the language of the new article 5(3) in the 2011 Treaty.
The 1990 consultation on the Technical fees article also led to
the first statement by the Chinese tax authorities regarding the
boundary between technical services and royalties. Even today,
there is little guidance within the context of Chinese domestic
law regarding how this difficult distinction is to be drawn. And
in the context of treaty interpretation, it was not until 2009 that
the SAT offered substantial guidance.18 However, in 1990, the SAT
was prompted to state, in connection with the 1984 Treaty, that
technical services did not include services rendered for purposes
of transferring proprietary technology, which would, rather, be
covered by the Royalties article, while services provided in
connection with hardware should be regarded as technical services.19
All of these interpretations reduced the scope of application of
the Technical fees article. However, there is a more fundamental
issue affecting the article’s significance that was not resolved
until 2011. The article deems technical fees to arise in the state
of the payer, even if services are provided entirely outside that
17.
Art. 4 Protocol (1996) to the P.R.C.-U.K. Income Tax Treaty (1984).
18.
Guoshuihan (2009) No. 507 (SAT, 14 Sept. 2009) (Notice on Questions concerning the Implementation
of the ‘Royalties’ Article under Tax Treaties)
19.
By implication, services provided in connection with software are likely to be covered by the Royalties
article. See Guoshuihanfa [1990]1097, supra n. 14, at sec. 1(2).
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state. Consequently, if services are provided to a Chinese party
but are performed entirely outside of China, would the fees be
taxable? The answer depends, of course, also on Chinese domestic
law. Before 1991, technical fees not connected with a PE in China
were explicitly exempt from taxation in China.20 After that, Chinese
domestic income tax law in respect of both enterprises and
individuals also sourced income for services to the place where
the services were performed. This meant that income for services
performed by non-residents outside China would not be taxable under
Chinese domestic law. Assuming that, as a matter of general
principle, a tax treaty cannot bestow on a state any taxing power
that it has not exercised under its domestic law, the Technical
fees article should not have had the effect of extending China’s
authority to tax technical services provided outside China. However,
it was unclear whether or not this general principle applied in
China. It was only as recently as 2011 that the SAT explicitly
confirmed that, even if a Technical fees article deemed certain
fees for services provided outside China to arise within China,
thereby giving China the right to tax under the tax treaty, Chinese
domestic rules should be applied and such fees should not be taxed.21
The 2011 guidance only has effect from 16 March 2011 and it is likely
that Chinese tax agencies had sometimes regarded the Technical fees
article as giving them a taxing right that they did not have under
domestic law.
The deletion of the Technical fees article in the 2011 Treaty still
leaves one question unanswered, i.e. how income that would have
been classified as technical fees under the 1984 Treaty should be
taxed under the 2011 Treaty. It should be noted that the SAT has
already stated elsewhere22 that at least some of the services
classified as generating technical fees would, in the absence of
a Technical fees article, be classified as business profits. This
is surely correct in the most common cases, i.e. technical fees
provided cross-border are rarely not part of the “profit of an
enterprise”.23 On the other hand, it is conceivable that some
technical fees could not be characterized as business profits. In,
but only in, such cases, what would have been classified under a
Technical fees article could fall under the Other Income article,
20.
See [85] Caishuiwaizi 042, supra n. 12, at sec. 5(2).
21.
SAT Bulletin [2011] 19, Bulletin Regarding Certain Issues in the Implementation of the Technical Fees
Article of the China-UK Treaty and Certain Other Bilateral Tax Treaties (16 Mar. 2011).
22.
See Guoshuihan (2009) No. 507, supra n. 18, at sec. 6.
23.
See K. van Raad, Coherence among the OECD Model’s Distributive Rules: the “Other” State and
Income from Third Countries, in Essays on Tax Treaties: A Tribute to David A. Ward ch. 4 (G. Maisto, A.
Nikolakakis, and J. Ulmer, eds.,Can. Tax Found. & IBFD 2013).
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which the 2011 Treaty now contains.24
3. PEs
The 2011 Treaty amends article 5 of the 1984 Treaty in several
important aspects. First, a building site, a construction, assembly
or installation project or connected supervisory activities now
constitute a PE only if they continue for more than 12 months, as
opposed to six months. Second, a standard “services PE” clause has
been added, such that services provided in a state for periods
aggregating 183 days or more in any 12-month period give rise to
a PE. These changes are in line with recent treaty practices of
both China and the United Kingdom, as well as with the OECD Model
(2010),25 in the case of the 12-month-period for construction site
PEs, and the UN Model (2011),26 in the case of service PEs.
A third change to article 5 in the 2011 Treaty, however, introduces
something new. In article 5(6), which provides that agents of an
independent status do not create a PE, new wording (shown in italics)
has been added as to what does not qualify as an independent agent:
[PCD single spaced]
However, when the activities of such an agent are devoted
wholly or almost wholly on behalf of that enterprise, and
conditions are made or imposed between that enterprise and
the agent in their commercial and financial relations which
differ from those which would have been made between
independent enterprises, he will not be considered an agent
of an independent status within the meaning of this
paragraph.
The italicized text is derived from the revision to article 5(7)
of the UN Model (2001),27,28 but has only infrequently been used by
China and the United Kingdom in previous tax treaties. With regard
to for the United Kingdom, it has appeared in the tax treaties
concluded with Kuwait (1999), Jordan (2001) and Libya (2008) and,

24.
The new Other Income article in the P.R.C.-U.K. Income Tax Treaty (2011) generally allocates taxing
rights to the resident state, unless the income is connected with a PE in the other contracting state. However, as
discussed in sections 4. and 5., this treatment is qualified by a beneficial ownership requirement, a “special
relationship” limitation, and an anti-abuse rule that examines the “purpose of the creation or assignment” of the
right in respect of which income is paid.
25.
OECD Model Tax Convention on Income and on Capital (22 July 2010), Models IBFD.
26.
UN Model Tax Convention on Income and on Capital (1 Jan. 2011), Models IBFD.
27.
UN Model Tax Convention on Income and on Capital (1 Jan. 2001), Models IBFD.
28.
For a fascinating discussion of the history of the “wholly or almost wholly” provision in article 5(7),
see R. Vann, The UN Model and Agents: “Wholly or Almost Wholly”, in Maisto, Nikolakakis & Ulmer eds.,
supra n. 23, at ch. 5.

8
with regard to China, it has appeared in the tax treaties concluded
with Nigeria (2002), Morocco (2002), Azerbaijan (2005) and
Singapore (2007). Both the language and the rationale for the
introduction of this revision into the UN Model (2001) are
problematic, and its interpretation in practice is likely to give
rise to confusion.
On the face of it, the issue of whether an agent is an independent
one (or whether it is, instead, dependent on the principal) is
orthogonal to the issue of whether the agent and principal deal
on arm’s-length terms. An employee is a paradigm example of a
dependent agent, but an employee is entirely capable of dealing
with the employer on arm’s-length terms in the employment
relationship, for example, compensation, duties and obligations
can be determined entirely in accordance with market practice. The
fact that the principal pays the agent market compensation should
not, therefore, affect the determination of whether or not the agent
is dependent. In the traditional understanding of what makes an
agent dependent for purposes of article 5, as is evidenced by the
Commentary on Article 5(5) of the OECD Model, which is also quoted
in the Commentary on Article 5(5) of the UN Model, the key issues
are: (1) whether the agent’s commercial activities for the
principal are subject to detailed instructions or to comprehensive
control; (2) whether the entrepreneurial risk of the relevant
activity is borne by the agent or principal; and (3) whether the
agent’s activities on behalf of the principal are undertaken in
the ordinary course of the agent’s business.29 The fact that the
activities of the agent are performed wholly or almost wholly on
behalf of only one principal is believed to reduce the likelihood
of independent agency.30 Presumably, this is because having only
one principal increases the likelihood that the agent is subject
to comprehensive control (criterion (1)) and reduces its capacity
to bear risk (criterion (2)). The agent would also not have its
own ordinary course of business among which are that it serves the
principal (criterion (3)).31 Apparently, the presumption of the
lack of dependence of a “single-principal agent” at one point seemed

29.
See of the OECD Model Tax Convention on Income and on Capital: Commentary on Article 5(6) paras.
38-38.8 (22 July 2010), Models IBFD and UN Model Tax Convention on Income and on Capital: Commentary
on Article 5 paras. 30-33 (1 Jan. 2011), Models IBFD. These criteria are incorporated into China’s interpretation
of the criteria for independent agents for the purposes of article 5. See Guoshifa [2010] 75, supra n. 16,
annotations on Article 5(6).
30.
But having multiple principals is not itself sufficient to establish independence. See para. 38.6 OECD
Model: Commentary on Article 5(5) (2010).
31.
Although why this should matter is a question that can be raised regarding the “ordinary course of
business” test in general. See the discussion the three subsequent paragraphs in this article.
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to be so strong that, in the UN Model (1980)32 as well as many tax
treaties, including the 1984 Treaty, such an agent is explicitly
stated not to be independent, even though, under the OECD Commentary
on Article 5, this factor should not be “decisive”.
However, the UN Model (2001) inserted the arm’s-length requirement
to mitigate the presumption of non-independence in respect of a
single-principal agent.33 The rationale given is, first that it is
“anomalous ... that if the number of enterprises for which an
independent agent was working fell to one, the agent would, without
further examination, be treated as dependent”. In order to address
this anomaly, it is stated that “the essential criterion for
automatically treating an agent as not being of ‘an independent
status’ is the absence of the arm’s-length relationship”. This is
a puzzling statement. Some might find it persuasive that having
only one principal may not be conclusive evidence regarding the
satisfaction of criteria (1) to (3), i.e. control, risk, and
ordinary course of business, in the preceding paragraph and that
an irrefutable presumption may result in errors. Nevertheless, it
is unclear as to how an arm’s-length relationship bears on the three
traditional criteria for agency independence. Consider, for
example, the question of whether or not a subsidiary can be an
independent agent of the parent. The answer is yes34 if the same
criteria, for example, those regarding control, risk and ordinary
course of business, applying to unrelated enterprises are satisfied.
However, whether or not the subsidiary’s activities are wholly or
almost wholly taken on behalf of the parent, it could certainly
be the case that “conditions [are] imposed ... in their commercial
and financial relations which differ from those which would have
been made between independent enterprises”. In other words, it
appears that a subsidiary may deal with its parent on
non-arm’s-length terms, for example, by receiving insufficient
consideration by market standards, and yet still act as an
independent agent that has control, bears risk and serves other
principals. Why, then, should the presence of non-arm’s-length
dealing suddenly become relevant when there is only one (or almost
only one) principal?
Accordingly, the language in article 5(7) of the UN Model (2001),
which was introduced into article 5(6) of the 2011 Treaty, arguably
contains a non-sequitur. The significance of this language lies
32.
UN Model Tax Convention on Income and on Capital (1 Jan. 1980), Models IBFD.
33.
UN Model Tax Convention on Income and on Capital: Commentary on Article 5 paras. 32 and 33 (1
Jan. 2001), Models IBFD.
34.
Para. 38.1 OECD Model: Commentary on Article 5 (2010).

10
in the fact that it is likely to be read as not just relevant to
applying the presumption of dependence in the case of a
single-principal agent, but as also relevant to the determination
of the nature of independent agency in general. In a rather inchoate
way, it may give rise to the intuition that arm’s-length dealing
in itself counts against the characterization of agency as
dependent.
This intuition could be tempting to resort to in connection with
certain other anomalies that tax treaties themselves create.
Consider the situation in which enterprise X of Country B has a
fixed place of business in Country A , which constitutes a PE of
enterprise X in Country A. The PE provides various services
exclusively, for example, consulting and market information, to
enterprise X’s headquarters in Country B. An affiliate of
enterprise X, enterprise Y, which is also resident in Country B,
wishes to avail itself of the services provided by enterprise X,
and considers the possibility of getting it from enterprise X via
enterprise X’s PE in Country A. From the perspective of enterprise
X and enterprise Y, this is a commercially sensible business
arrangement and enterprise Y may be willing to pay an arm’s-length
price for the services. But there is a substantial risk that the
arrangement could give rise to a PE for enterprise Y in Country
A. The reason for this is that, while enterprise X provides the
services for itself through the PE in Country A, according to
standard interpretations of the independent agent exception to PEs35
this is not in the “ordinary course of business” in which X can
be said to provide the services to others. Accordingly, there is
a risk that enterprise X could be treated as a dependent agent of
enterprise Y if it were to provide the services to enterprise Y
via its PE in Country A. In order to reduce enterprise Y’s PE risk
from this apparently innocuous arrangement, it may be tempting to
structure the dealing between enterprise X and enterprise Y on an
arm’s-length basis, and seek comfort from that. However, the
anomaly in the case in question really arises because of the
“ordinary course of business” requirement and has nothing to do
with non-arm’s-length dealing. In order to see the difference
between the two issues, it should be noted that country A may require
enterprise X and enterprise Y to deal on an arm’s-length basis with
regard to the services provided from Country A for purposes of
computing the profits attributable to the PE, even if enterprise
Y is not deemed to have a PE in Country A by virtue of the contract
35.
See the example of the commission agent in paragraph 38.7 of the OECD Model: Commentary on
Article 5 (2010).
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with enterprise X.
Accordingly, by adding the new language on arm’s-length dealings
to article 5(6) of the 2011 Treaty, both China and the United Kingdom
may have inadvertently fallen deeper into this conceptual morass.
4. Passive and Other Income
With regard to passive income, the most substantial changes
effected by the 2011 Treaty relate to dividends and capital gains.36
Specifically, in respect of dividends, the maximum withholding tax
rate for a greater than 25% shareholders is reduced from 10% to
5%. In the original version of the 2011 Treaty, The shareholding
percentage took into account both direct and indirect ownership,
making this aspect of the 2011 Treaty more favourable to UK
investors37 than similar provisions in China’s other recent tax
treaties, for example those with Hong Kong (2006), Singapore (2007)
and Belgium (2009). However, this was modified by the Protocol
(2013), which restores the shareholding percentage requirement to
a direct ownership of no less than 25%, consistent with the other
recent tax treaties. Meanwhile, a specific provision in respect
of real estate investment trust (REIT) distributions38 caps the
withholding tax rate on REIT distributions at 15%. While this
appears to be the first time that a provision regarding REITs has
been included in a Chinese tax treaty, it is not an uncommon
provision in UK tax treaties.
What is more remarkable is a new paragraph that exempts the
governments and state-owned entities of both countries from tax
on dividends received from companies resident in the other country.
Article 10(3) of the 2011 Treaty states that:
[PCD single spaced]
... dividends paid by a company which is a resident of a
Contracting State to a resident of the other Contracting
State shall be taxable only in that other Contracting State
36.
Professor van Raad drew the author’s attention to the fact that in articles 10(1), the formulation
“dividends derived by ... a resident of the other Contracting State” in the P.R.C.-U.K. Income Tax Treaty (1984)
has been changed to “dividends paid..to a resident of the other Contracting” in the P.R.C.-U.K. Income Tax
Treaty (2011), and that the same changes were made to articles 11(1) and 12(1). While this conforms the
relevant provisions of the P.R.C.-U.K. Income Tax Treaty (2011) to the OECD Model, whether it is an
improvement is open to debate.
37.
The current benefit for Chinese investors in UK companies is limited because of the current UK tax
exemption for dividends paid by UK companies to foreign shareholders.
38.
Art. 10(2)(b) P.R.C.-U.K. Income Tax Treaty (2011). Specifically, “an investment vehicle which
distributes most of [its] income or gains annually and whose income or gains from ... immovable property is
exempted from tax”.
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if the beneficial owner of the dividend is the Government
of that other Contracting State or any of its institutions;
or other entity the capital of which is wholly-owned
directly or indirectly by the Government of that other
Contracting State.
As unusual as this provision may appear, it is not new in tax treaties.
For instance, the China-Saudi Arabia (2006)39 and United Arab
Emirates-Vietnam (2009)40 Income and Capital Tax Treaties contained
identical or similar provisions for dividend exemptions. In a
larger number of tax treaties, several countries, for example,
Singapore, have negotiated dividend tax exemptions for governments
and specific listed state-owned entities. Some countries may take
the view that there is little policy reason to offer exemptions
to governments and state-owned entities with regard to one type
of investment income41 but not others, and have negotiated
treaty-based exemptions for dividend, interest, capital gains42 and
even all income derived by governments and “their institutions”.43
Awareness of (and interest in) this practice may still be limited
among the OECD member countries, although growing.44 Once this
practice is taken into account, the most surprising aspect of the
dividend exemption for governments and state-owned entities in the
2011 Treaty is not its appearance, but, rather, the fact that it
has been introduced at a time when the United Kingdom exempts
dividends paid by UK companies to foreign investors. This means
that the immediate beneficiaries of the new article 10(3) are UK
government institutions and UK state-owned entities, and not their
Chinese counterparts, even though the latter are more numerous and
39.
Agreement between the Government of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the Government of the
People's Republic of China for the Avoidance of Double Taxation and the Prevention of Tax Evasion with
respect to Taxes on Income and on Capital (23 Jan. 2006), Treaties IBFD.
40.
Agreement between the Government of United Arab Emirates and the Government of the Socialist
Republic of Vietnam for the Avoidance of Double Taxation and the Prevention of Fiscal Evasion with respect to
Taxes on Income and on Capital (16 Feb. 2009), Treaties IBFD.
41.
There is a well-known and long-standing practice in tax treaties of providing a tax exemption for
interest on loans where either the borrower or the lender is a contracting state’s government.
42.
See, for example, Agreement between the Government of Canada and the Government of the State of
Kuwait for the Avoidance of Double Taxation and the Prevention of Fiscal Evasion with respect to Taxes on
Income and on Capital art. 21 (28 Jan. 2002), Treaties IBFD.
43.
See Convention between the Government of the Republic of India and the Government of the People's
Republic of Bangladesh for the Avoidance of Double Taxation and the Prevention of Fiscal Evasion with respect
to Taxes on Income (27 Aug. 1991), Treaties IBFD and Agreement between the Government of the Republic of
India and the Government of the United Arab Emirates for the Avoidance of Double Taxation and the Prevention
of Fiscal Evasion with respect to Taxes on Income and on Capital (29 Apr. 1992), Treaties IBFD.
44.
See OECD, Discussion Draft on the Application of Tax Treaties to State-Owned Entities, Including
Sovereign Wealth Funds (OECD 2009), International Organizations’ Documentation IBFD, also available at
www.oecd.org/document/57/0,3746,en_2649_33747_44120057_1_1_1_1,00.html, which had the intention of
revising the OECD Model: Commentaries in specifically addressing state-owned entities, proposed in 2009 and
largely adopted in the OECD Model: Commentaries (2010).
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have much larger current overseas investments.
It is useful to compare the dividend exemption in article 10(3)
of the 2011 Treaty with an analogous interest exemption in article
11(3). The 2011 Treaty extends a previous exemption regarding
interest income “derived by a Government, a political sub-division
or local authority thereof, and the Central Bank or any agency of
the Government” to “entities wholly owned by” such government
persona. Accordingly, a sovereign wealth fund from China is exempt
from tax on interest received from a UK borrower under the 2011
Treaty, whereas, under the 1984 Treaty, it might not be.45 The
commercial significance of the revised article 11(3) is, therefore,
greater than that of the new article 10(3). It can only be hoped
that whether or not anything is intended by the differences in
wording between the two exemptions, i.e. how is the concept of the
“institutions” of a government under article 10(3) to be
interpreted, and does ownership under article 11(3) encompass
indirect ownership, will be clarified in the future.
With regard to capital gains, except for a paragraph addressing
gains from the alienation of ships or aircraft, the 1984 Treaty
only states that “gains which arise in a Contracting State may be
taxed by that State in accordance with the provisions of its domestic
law”. The 1984 Treaty also does not contain an Other Income article
and, therefore, does not place a limit, with regard to income not
dealt with elsewhere in the tax treaty, on the domestic law of a
contracting state with regard to the taxation of income or gains
arising in that state. The 2011 Treaty reverses this approach and
gives priority to the residence state to tax residual capital gains
and other income, which is consistent with the provisions of the
OECD Model. The revised Capital Gains article reserves to the
resident state the exclusive taxing right over capital gains from
the alienation of property other than immovable property, property
connected to a PE or fixed base, the shares of land-rich companies,
and the shares of companies of the other contracting state held
by substantial (25% or more, including both direct and indirect
holdings) shareholders. This allocation of taxing rights in respect
of capital gains is not unusual for either China or the United
Kingdom and it can be expected that the application of the article
45.
Even under article 11(3) of the P.R.C.-U.K. Income Tax Treaty (1984), “interest ... derived by ... [a]
resident of that other Contracting State with respect to debt-claims of that resident which are financed...by the
Government of that other Contracting State ... shall be exempt from tax in the first-mentioned Contracting State”.
If a debt-claim held by a sovereign wealth fund is financed by (the equity capital of) its government shareholder
(which it is likely to be), any interest should be exempt. In any case, the P.R.C.-U.K. Income Tax Treaty (2011)
extends this aspect of the interest exemption as well, to debt-claims financed by a wholly-owned entity.
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in China, where, in contrast to the United Kingdom, capital gains
arising from the alienation of shares by non-residents are taxable,
will be carried out with familiarity. In contrast, the Other Income
article (article 21) of the 2011 Treaty adopts an approach that
is still unusual in the tax treaties that China has concluded, in
that it gives the resident state exclusive taxing rights for income
not dealt with elsewhere in a tax treaty, except for income connected
with a PE in the other contracting state. This addition makes the
2011 Treaty a particularly favourable one among the tax treaties
concluded by China with its major treaty partners.46
In addition, with regard to the Other Income article, as the
allocation of exclusive taxing rights over other income to the
resident state is still an exception to China’s general treaty
policy, it is unsurprising that the following limitation on such
an allocation appears in article 21(3) of the 2011 Treaty, the author
believes, for the first time in the tax treaties concluded by China:
[PCD single spaced]
Where, by reason of a special relationship between the
resident referred to in paragraph 1 and some other person,
or between both of them and some third person, the amount
of the income referred to in that paragraph exceeds the
amount (if any) which would have been agreed upon between
them in the absence of such a relationship, the provisions
of this Article shall apply only to the last-mentioned
amount. In such a case, the excess part of the income shall
remain taxable according to the laws of each Contracting
State, due regard being had to the other applicable
provisions of this Agreement.
Although this language is not uncommon for the tax treaties
concluded by the United Kingdom,47 its interpretation raises
interesting questions. The provision is modelled on similar
provisions in articles 11 (Interest) and 12 (Royalties) of the OECD
Model.48 Both the Commentaries on the OECD Model and the
Commentaries on the UN Model suggest that its recommended adoption
46.
Other tax treaties that give the resident state exclusive right to tax (non-PE-related) other income
include Agreement between the Government of Ireland and the Government of the People's Republic of China
for the Avoidance of Double Taxation and the Prevention of Fiscal Evasion with respect to Taxes on Income (19
Apr. 2000), Treaties IBFD, Agreement between the Government of the People's Republic of China and the
Government of Malta for the Avoidance of Double Taxation and the Prevention of Fiscal Evasion with respect to
Taxes on Income (23 Oct. 2010), Treaties IBFD [hereinafter: P.R.C.-Malta Income Tax Treaty] and possibly
others.
47.
A cursory search suggests that, in addition to the United Kingdom, Japan has also routinely adopted
this paragraph in the Other Income article of the tax treaties that it has recently negotiated.
48.
See Arts. 11(6) and (12 (4) OECD Model (2010).
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is motivated by non-traditional financial instruments, i.e. the
income generated by way of which may, presumably, defy
classification by the other traditional distributive articles.49
Both the language of the provision and its purported motivation
imply a particular conception of the type of income included in
the scope of article 21. According to this concept, such income
simply has a character that makes the other “distributive rules”
of a tax treaty, for example, articles 6 to 20 of the OECD Model,
inapplicable. Nonetheless, such income is similar to interest or
royalties in that one of the contracting states can be said to be
the source of the income. The effect of the Other Income article
is to provide for a zero rate of withholding by the source state.
Alternatively, the source state may adopt a lowered, negotiated
rate of withholding.50 Along these lines, the source state of the
“other income” would yield some of its taxing right to the resident
state only with regard to that portion of the income that conforms
to arm’s-length standards.
As treaty specialists recognize, however, the Other Income article
is broader in scope. It covers types of income that fall outside
the scope of the other distributive rules of a tax treaty not by
virtue of their character, but by virtue of the lack of a specific
nexus with a contracting state. In other words, many of the other
distributive rules of tax treaties are incomplete,51 as they
allocate taxing rights between source and residence states only
with regard to income with particular characters and particular
connections with the “source state”. As a result, article 21 is
necessary to address another type of situation, where an item of
income arises in a third state, and the intention is to give only
the resident state, among the two contracting parties to a tax treaty,
the taxing right.52 Examples include rent paid by a resident of a
contracting state for the use of immovable property situated in
a third state53 and the income from third states of a dual resident
who is deemed to be a resident of one of the contracting states
through the application of the treaty tie-breaker rules.54 In these
49.
See paragraphs 7-10 of the OECD Model: Commentary on Article 21 (2010) and paragraph 6 of the UN
Model: Commentary on Article 21 (2011).
50.
Para. 6 UN Model: Commentary on Article 21 (2011).
51.
The main exceptions are the rules for business profits and income from employment. Articles 7 and 15
allocate the taxing rights regarding to these two types of income in all cases, either to the resident state or to the
PE state or the place where the employment is exercised. Articles 8 and 17 also provide a comprehensive
allocation and leave no scope for article 21.
52.
See paragraph 1 of the OECD Model: Commentary on Article 21 (2010), which states that “[t]he scope
of the Article is not confined to income arising in a Contracting State; it extends also to income from third
States”.
53.
Para. 2 UN Model: Commentary on Article 21 (2011).
54.
Para. 1 OECD Model: Commentary on Article 21 (2010).
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cases, the source state that is not a contracting state in respect
of the tax treaty in question presumably has its own taxing rights.
The function of the Other Income article is not for one contracting
state cede its primary taxing right as the source state to the other
contracting state as the residence state, but, rather, to limit
the number of states with secondary, non-source state taxing
rights.55
The question that arises is how does the “special relationship”
limitation on the operation of the Other Income article apply to
income from third countries? Where a payment is excessive under
arm’s-length standards, do the two treaty partner states, neither
of which can claim to be “the source state”, have equal rights to
tax the income, despite one being the residence state and the other
not? Take the example of the taxpayer who is a dual resident of
both State A and State B and who is deemed to be resident in State
B for purposes of the State A-State B Tax Treaty. Both State A and
State B would be entitled to subject the taxpayer to residence-based
taxation on any “excessive other income” derived from third states
under the “special relationship” limitation in article 21. Is this
result the appropriate policy outcome? It is not at all clear why
this should be. Consider another example, where a resident of State
A rents from a resident of State B property situated in State C.
Suppose that the rental payment is excessive due to a special
relationship between the payer and payee and that State A’s domestic
law considers the source of the rent to be the residence of the
payer. Here, the adoption of the “special relationship” limitation
in article 21 means that State A’s source rule effectively applies
to the “excessive” portion of the rental payment. This may be the
right policy outcome if the “excessive” portion should be regarded
as somehow not sourced in State C but “really” sourced in State
A, for example, the excess is attributable to the special relation
between payer and payee but not to the underlying business involving
the property in State C. But whether or not this is the case depends
on ascertaining further facts. It is not at all clear that an
automatic limitation on the Other Income article is the best way
to deal with this situation, especially given that State C may also
exercise full taxing rights with regard to the “excessive rent”.
In summary, how to appropriately apply the limitation on the general
rule regarding Other Income in situations involving “special
relationships”, so that it does not apply in circumstances in which
55.
Van Raad, supra n. 23, argues that this function of article 21 is “awkward” and perhaps originally
unintended.
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it is not supposed to,56 must be resolved by the treaty partners.
China has not made any pronouncement on this issue and how the UK
tax authorities apply the “special relationship” limitation to
cases in which “other income” arises in third states is also unknown.
5. Anti-Avoidance Provisions
The 2011 Treaty adds an anti-avoidance provision to the Dividend,
Interest, and Royalties articles. This provision is also
incorporated into the new Other Income article. The formulation
of the anti-avoidance provision is illustrated by article 10(7):
[PCD single spaced]
The provisions of this Article shall not apply if it was
the main purpose or one of the main purposes of any person
concerned with the creation or assignment of the shares or
other rights in respect of which the dividend is paid to
take advantage of this Article by means of that creation
or assignment.
Similar provisions have been included in the passive income
articles in UK tax treaties, going as far back as the Ireland-United
Kingdom Income Tax Treaty (1976),57,58 well before such a provision
was discussed in paragraph 21.4 of the Commentary on Article 1 of
the OECD Model (2003).59,60 However, this anti-avoidance rule has
been incorporated only in four of the other tax treaties concluded
by China, all of which postdate the OECD Commentary on Article 1
(2003) and were renegotiated tax treaties, i.e. the tax treaties
with Singapore (2007), Belgium (2009), Finland (2010) and Malta
(2010).61 It is worth reflecting on the significance of this

56.
Another issue that should be noted that paragraph [what?] 9 of the OECD Model: Commentary on
Article 21 (2010) states that “[a]lthough the restriction could apply to any income otherwise subject to Article 21,
it is not envisaged that in practice it is likely to be applied to payments such as alimony payments or social
security payments”. It is, however, unclear, how such “understanding” is to be enforced, given that it is
evidently contrary to the language of the treaty text.
57.
Convention between the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and
the Government of the Republic of Ireland for the Avoidance of Double Taxation and the Prevention of Fiscal
Evasion with respect to Taxes on Income and Capital Gains (2 June 1976), Treaties IBFD.
58.
In fact, it appears that up to 1994, the rule was largely a creature of UK tax treaties, with Malta adding
a few more.
59.
OECD Model Tax Convention on Income and on Capital: Commentary on Article 1 (28 Jan. 2003),
Models IBFD.
60.
First in OECD, Restricting the Entitlement to Treaty Benefits (OECD 2002), International
Organizations’ Documentation IBFD (adopted by the OECD Committee on Fiscal Affairs on 7 November 2002)
and then in the OECD, 2002 Update to the Model Tax Convention (OECD 2002) (adopted by the Council of the
OECD on 28 January 2003).
61.
As, among these tax treaties, the allocation of general taxing rights with respect to Other Income to the
resident state is only adopted in P.R.C.-Malta Income Tax Treaty, the language has only appeared in the Other
Income article of that tax treaty.
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disparity, especially given the fact that the United Nations, in
the Commentary on Article 1 of the UN Model (2011), suggests that
this particular anti-avoidance rule may be especially appropriate
for developing countries, i.e. “[taking into] account of their
ability to administer the various approaches” in countering treaty
shopping. This is because, for such countries, “it may be difficult
to apply very detailed rules that require access to substantial
information about foreign entities”. The “more general approach ...
proposed in paragraph 21.4 [of the OECD Commentary on Article 1]
might be more adapted to their own circumstances”.62
The more detailed anti-avoidance rules discussed in the UN
Commentary on Article 1 (2011) include “look-through” and
“subject-to-tax” approaches for dealing with conduit arrangements,
extensive limitation of benefits clauses and language relating to
specific foreign preferential regimes.63 The implementation of such
treaty-based rules may require information as to the financial
operations, ownership and other features of (including legal
regimes applying to) the treaty benefit claimant. But as long as
the question of whether or not the grant of treaty benefits is
appropriate is broached, it appears that government access to
information should not be a problem if the burden of proof lies
with the taxpayer. If, on the other hand, the burden of proof is
assumed to fall on the government, establishing that a main purpose
of the person “concerned with the creation or assignment of rights”
was to take advantage of a treaty provision is, in most circumstances,
not an easy task. The main purpose test is presumably objective,
thereby requiring a consideration of all of the circumstances.
Perhaps, one way to view the relationship between anti-avoidance
rules and the “more detailed” rules discussed in the Commentaries
on the OECD Model and Commentaries on the UN Model is to analogize
it to the relationship between general anti-avoidance rules (GAARs)
and specific anti-avoidance rules (SAARs). The creation or
assignment of a right to achieve a tax advantage sounds like “an
arrangement”. Many GAARs currently used in the world refer to
artificial arrangements with a main purpose of tax avoidance. The
Chinese GAAR, for example, is targeted at instances “where an
enterprise enters into [an] arrangement without reasonable
commercial purpose and this results in a reduction of taxable gross

62.
Para. 57 UN Model: Commentary on Article 1 (2011).
63.
These options are taken from paragraphs 13-21.3 of the OECD Model: Commentary on Article 1
(2010).
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income or taxable income”.64 An “arrangement without a reasonable
commercial purpose” is defined as one “the primary purpose of which
is to reduce, avoid or defer tax payments”.65 The rule seeking the
“purpose of creation or assignment” may, therefore, be regarded
as a GAAR applied to particular types of income. SAARs, in contrast,
describe the features of specific abusive transactions to limit
their effect. Very few people would be willing to claim that GAARs
are easier to administer than SAARs. They may be easier to announce,
but, due to limitations in information and research resources at
the legislative or rulemaking stage, tax authorities (from both
developed and developing countries) may be hesitant to endorse and
to commit to the enforcement of particular SAARs, and GAARs may
help to postpone the task of adopting such specific formulations.
However, when GAARs are implemented, specific criteria must still
be adopted and applied, and factual investigation regarding the
particular case is unavoidable. The parsimony of GAARs is manifest
at the legislative stage, not at the implementation stage. In fact,
where tax avoidance arrangements tend to resemble one another and
do not always display unique relevant features, it may be better
for resource and capacity-restrained tax authorities to adopt
detailed rules in advance, instead of having to formulate
appropriate criteria under a GAAR.66
Rather than being the easier of the two types of anti-avoidance
rules to implement, GAARs are commonly understood as a backstop
for SAARs. When implementing detailed rules is insufficient, tax
authorities may want to have an additional mechanism by considering
taxpayer intent. GAARs complement, but do not substitute, SAARs.
If this is right, contrary to what the Commentaries on the UN Model
cited earlier in this section implies, it makes perfect sense that
a developed country like the United Kingdom, which has an
experienced and resourceful tax administration, would be more
willing than China to incorporate the “purpose of creation or
assignment” rule in its tax treaties. In other words, the United
Kingdom has the capacity to implement both SAARs and GAARs.67
What does this analysis reveal as to the significance of the use,
64.
CN: Enterprise Income Tax Law (promulgated by the National People’s Congress, 16 March 2007,
effective 1 January 2008), art. 47. In such situations, “tax agencies shall have the authority to make adjustments
using appropriate methods”.
65.
CN: Regulation on the Implementation of the Enterprise Income Tax Law (promulgated by the State
Council, 6 December 2007, effective 1 January 2008), art. 120.
66.
See, generally, L. Kaplow, Rules versus Standards: An Economic Analysis, 42 Duke L. J. 3, pp.
557-629 (1992).
67.
It is an interesting question, but beyond the scope of this article, as to how the United Kingdom has
implemented the “purpose of creation or assignment” rule in the past.
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in four different articles in the 2011 Treaty, of the rule referring
to “purpose of creation or assignment”? First, with regard to all
dividends, interest, royalties and other income, the 2011 Treaty
arguably contains a SAAR of sorts, i.e. the concept of beneficial
ownership.68 China’s SAT has interpreted this concept, in the
context of all tax treaties, to encompass a rich set of
requirements,69 such that conduit companies can never be beneficial
owners, and even a set of limitation-of-benefits-like tests must
be applied. While these interpretations may be controversial, they
borrow precisely from the “more detailed” rules for countering
treaty shopping in the Commentaries on the OECD Model and the
Commentaries on the UN Model. The role of beneficial ownership as
a SAAR has also been enhanced in the United Kingdom post Indofood
(2006).70 It could, therefore, be expected that “purpose of creation
or assignment” rule would apply when the beneficial ownership
determination is believed to be insufficient or generate
inappropriate results.
Second, insofar as the contracting states have already adopted
GAARs under their domestic laws, and China has, and the United
Kingdom is considering the adoption of one,71 the “purpose of
creation or assignment” rule does not add a separate, treaty-based
anti-avoidance instrument. In this connection, it is notable that
the 2011 Treaty requires no competent authority consultation in
the application of the rule.72 The effect of the introduction of
the rule in articles 10 to 12 and 21 may, therefore, be comparable
to another newly introduced anti-avoidance provision that applies
to the whole of the 2011 Treaty. This is the new article 23
(Miscellaneous Rule), which reads as follows:
[PCD single spaced]
Nothing in this Agreement shall prejudice the right of each
Contracting State to apply its domestic laws and measures
concerning the prevention of tax evasion and avoidance,
whether or not described as such, insofar as they do not
give rise to taxation contrary to this Agreement.

68.
It should be noted that the concept of beneficial ownership is not used in the Other Income article in the
OECD Model and the UN Model.
69.
The basic Chinese rules regarding beneficial ownership under tax treaties are in SAT, Notice on How to
Interpret and Determine “Beneficial Owners” in Tax Treaties, Guoshuihan [2009] 601 (27 Oct. 2009) and SAT,
Bulletin Regarding the Determination of “Beneficial Owners” in Tax Treaties, Bulletin No. 30, 2012 (29 June
2012).
70.
UK: CA, 2 Mar. 2006, Indofood International Finance Limited v. JPMorgan Chase Bank NA, London
Branch, [2006] EWCA Civ 158, Tax Treaty Case Law IBFD.
71.
See www.hm-treasury.gov.uk/tax_avoidance_gaar.htm.
72.
Numerous UK tax treaties do impose this requirement for applying the “purpose of creation or
assignment” rule.
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The language of article 23, which appears for the first time in
a UK tax treaty and in China’s tax treaties for only the sixth time,73
arguably only reiterates certain widely agreed principles already
articulated in the Commentaries on the OECD Model.74 The legal
significance of its incorporation in the text of the tax treaty
is still unclear. But one possible interpretation is that it
reflects an understanding between the contracting states that the
application of various anti-avoidance rules, whether based on the
tax treaty or domestic law, should be on a mutually acceptable basis
and that it is when anti-avoidance efforts are pursued this way
that the contracting state seeking to deny treaty benefits has the
support of the other contracting state.
6. Conclusions
The importance of the Chinese and UK economies, as well as the volume
of trade and investment between the two countries, suggest that
the 1984 Treaty embodies an important treaty relationship for both
countries. Within this relationship, the countries have
demonstrated an ability and a willingness to resolve differences
in understanding, both through the amendment of the tax treaty and
other informal arrangements.75 While the 2011 Treaty still contains
mostly standardized provisions and few aspects of the tax treaty
can be said to be truly novel (the inclusion of indirect shareholding
in calculating ownership percentages for purposes of the reduced
rate on dividends, now reversed by the Protocol (2013), would have
been such a novelty), it has clearly been updated to more recent
treaty norms. The 2011 Treaty, therefore, represents a promising
framework for the further elaboration of the benefit of UK and
Chinese taxpayers doing business with one another.

73.
With the exception of Arrangement between the Mainland of China and the Hong Kong Special
Administrative Region for the Avoidance of Double Taxation and the Prevention of Fiscal Evasion with respect
to Taxes on Income (21 Aug. 2006) Treaties IBFD, all of China’s tax treaties in which the article 23 language
appears also contain the “purpose of creation or assignment” rule for passive income.
74.
See paragraphs 9.1-9.2 and 22-22.2 of the OECD Model: Commentary on Article 1 (2010).
75.
See the discussion in section 2. with regard to the correction of the reported misunderstanding in
respect of the P.R.C.-U.K. Income Tax Treaty (1984) regarding technical fees.

